Drawing on existing literature in border studies, this article interprets the Indo-Myanmar frontier not as a territorial boundary but rather as a politically contested space of non-sovereignty, security and market transactions. This study merges borderland politics theory with securitization, regional security complexes and border trade studies to explain the vexing disconnection between Indo-Myanmar border policy and its outcome. The article uses a qualitative synthesis of academic literature, policy documents and reliable conflict- and trafficking-focused studies to explore three inter-linked mechanisms that shape outcomes: (a) rugged geography coupled with differential state infrastructural presence; (b) ongoing cross-border ethnic and kinship networks facilitating routine movement and unregulated trade; and (c) splintered authority and structural violence across Myanmar’s borderland regions but especially since the 2021 coup. Securitized "hard border" strategies may move illegal traffic offshore but not out of reach, and shift the transactional costs onto legitimate livelihoods (Donnan & Wilson, 2010; UNODC, 2023). In contrast, externally driven infrastructure coordination strategies aid legal trade but might increase the supply capacity for trafficking when institutional development and accountability do not keep pace with infrastructure construction (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2004; ADB, 2018). This article contributes to political science by adopting an integrated borderland approach that produces security and trade as political consequences. It concludes with policy recommendations, stressing the importance of intelligence-driven enforcement, legal mobility, small-scale trade routes that are both predictable and connective, and connective practices based on governance-first principles.